In Langston v. Dallas Commodity Company, No. 24-10883 (5th Cir. Nov. 17, 2025), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit addressed a recurring challenge in consumer bankruptcy practice: what happens when a trustee fails to properly continue a Section 341 meeting of creditors under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 2003(e)? While the court affirmed that such procedural failures do not automatically trigger a bright-line rule concluding the meeting, it established important precedent distinguishing between cases where another meeting is actually held versus cases where no further meeting occurs. Most significantly for practitioners, the decision underscores how easily debtors can waive the protections of the 30-day deadline to object to exemptions under Rule 4003(b)(1)—and provides a roadmap for avoiding such waivers.
[Read more…] about 5th Circuit Holds That The 30-Day Window To Object to Exemptions in Rule 4003(b)(1) Can Be WaivedThe 9th Circuit Holds A Homestead Exemption Is Limited to Statutory Cap in a Chapter 11 to 7 Conversion
The Ninth Circuit held that the failure to object to a claimed homestead exemption within the 30-day period does not allow the debtor to exempt more than the statutory limit when the case originated as a Chapter 11 bankruptcy and included conflicting representations regarding the exemptions.
Facts
Monte and Rosana Masingale filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in 2015, claiming a homestead exemption of “100% of FMV” (fair market value) for their residence. No party in interest objected within the 30-day window. The case was later converted to Chapter 7, and the Masingales sought to sell the home and retain all proceeds, despite the statutory cap on the homestead exemption.
Analysis
The court’s legal analysis focused on whether the initial lack of objection to the homestead exemption claim allowed the Masingales to exempt more than the statutory limit. The court distinguished this case from Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz and Schwab v. Reilly, which involved different circumstances and did not originate in Chapter 11.
The court noted that the Masingales, as Chapter 11 debtors-in-possession, owed fiduciary duties to their creditors. During the Chapter 11 proceedings, they made representations in their Disclosure Statement and Chapter 11 Plan that they were not claiming above-limit exemptions or that such exemptions would only be allowed after creditors were fully paid. These representations indicated that the homestead exemption would be limited to the statutory cap, contrary to their Schedule C notation of “100% of FMV.”
The court reasoned that these conflicting representations within the 30-day objection period affected whether the “100% of FMV” notation created a clear and objectionable exemption. The court emphasized that the fiduciary duties and specific statements made in Chapter 11 documents provided context that negated the need for an early objection based solely on the Schedule C notation. Therefore, the initial failure to object did not permit the Masingales to claim an exemption above the statutory limit.
Tips
- Clarify Exemption Claims: Ensure that exemption claims are clear and consistent across all bankruptcy documents to avoid disputes and objections.
- Understand Fiduciary Duties: Recognize that debtors-in-possession in Chapter 11 have fiduciary duties to creditors, and their representations can impact exemption claims.
- Timely Objections: While objections to facially invalid exemptions should be timely, consider the entire context and any additional representations made by the debtor within the objection period.
NCBRC filed an amicus brief in support of the Debtors and provided a moot court to Debtors’ counsel to prepare for oral arguments.
The 6th Circuit To Determine Whether the Debtors’ Post-Petition Application of Their Tax Refund to Future Tax Liabilities is Per Se Intent to Hinder a Trustee Justifying a Denial of Discharge
The Sixth Circuit in Wylie v Miller is reviewing the decision of the District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The district court reversed the bankruptcy court’s decision, holding that the bankruptcy court erred in applying a per se rule that the debtors’ post-petition application of their tax overpayment to future tax liabilities constituted an intent to hinder the trustee.
Facts
Jason and Leah Wylie filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy and were denied discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2)(B) by the bankruptcy court. The denial was based on the Wylies’ post-petition election to apply a $20,736 tax overpayment from their 2019 tax return to their 2020 tax liabilities, which the bankruptcy court interpreted as an intent to hinder the trustee.
Analysis
The court’s analysis centered on the bankruptcy court’s application of a per se rule regarding the debtors’ intent. The bankruptcy court found that the Wylies’ election to apply their 2019 tax overpayment to their 2020 tax liabilities was sufficient to establish an intent to hinder the trustee. This conclusion was drawn without direct evidence of the Wylies’ intent but rather inferred from the action itself, effectively applying a per se rule that such an action always constitutes intent to hinder.
The court found this application problematic because it did not consider the specific circumstances or the debtors’ actual intent. The court highlighted that intent to hinder, delay, or defraud must be supported by concrete evidence and not merely inferred from the action of applying tax overpayments. The Wylies had consistently made similar elections pre-petition, which the bankruptcy court had previously found were made without intent to hinder, delay, or defraud. The court emphasized that exceptions to discharge must be narrowly construed, and a broad per se rule undermines this principle by potentially denying a fresh start without sufficient evidence.
The court also noted that the bankruptcy court failed to account for the Wylies’ testimony, which consistently stated that their intent was to ensure payment of future tax liabilities, not to hinder the trustee. The bankruptcy court’s failure to distinguish between intent to prefer one creditor over another and intent to hinder the trustee further weakened its position. Therefore, the application of a per se rule was inappropriate, and the court reversed the decision, remanding for entry of a discharge.
NCBRC and NACBA filed an amicus brief in support of the Debtor/Appellee.
The 9th Circuit Reviews Whether Res Judicata Applies to Exemptions
The 9th Circuit Court in Nance v Warfield is considering whether to overrule the District Court of Nevada which held that the bankruptcy court erred in overruling the trustee’s res judicata-based objection to the debtor’s federal exemptions in the property and RV. The court also concluded that the bankruptcy court exceeded its authority by sua sponte granting an exemption for the RV under the federal wildcard exemption.
Facts
Lawrence Warfield, the trustee of Johnie Lee Nance’s bankruptcy estate, objected to Nance’s claimed exemptions for his property and RV under Arizona law. After the court sustained the trustee’s objections, Nance amended his schedule to claim exemptions under Washington law, and the trustee again objected. When those objections were sustained, Nance amended his schedule to claim federal exemptions. The bankruptcy court overruled the trustee’s objections to these federal exemptions and sua sponte granted an exemption for the RV under the federal wildcard exemption.
Analysis
The district court analyzed the applicability of res judicata to the debtor’s successive exemption claims. It noted that claim preclusion, a form of res judicata, bars litigation of claims that were or could have been raised in a prior action. The court applied the three-part test for claim preclusion: identity of claims, final judgment on the merits, and identity or privity between parties. The court found that the debtor’s claims for exemptions in the property and RV, regardless of the legal framework (Arizona, Washington, or federal law), arose from the same nucleus of operative facts and involved the same property. Therefore, the claims were identical.
The court also determined that the previous rulings sustaining the trustee’s objections constituted final judgments on the merits, satisfying the second criterion. Finally, the parties involved in the objections were identical, fulfilling the third requirement for claim preclusion. Consequently, the court concluded that the bankruptcy court erred in overruling the trustee’s objections based on res judicata.
Additionally, the court addressed the bankruptcy court’s sua sponte action to grant an exemption for the RV under the federal wildcard exemption. The court emphasized the principle of party presentation, which requires courts to decide only the questions presented by the parties. The court found that the bankruptcy court exceeded its authority by granting an exemption that the debtor had not claimed, noting that the debtor, represented by counsel, could have asserted the exemption but did not. Therefore, the court held that the bankruptcy court’s action was improper and reversed its decision.
NCBRC and NACBA filed an amicus brief in support of the Debtor/Appellant.
Debtor Misled Lender as to Discharge of Debt
The debtor’s conduct gave the lender reason to believe that the debt owed to him was not discharged, so the bankruptcy court did not err in finding that the lender’s continued collection efforts lacked the requisite scienter to support a contempt sanction for violation of the discharge injunction. Bernhard v. Kull (In re Bernhard), No. 22-854 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 3, 2023).
When his business began to suffer financially, the debtor borrowed $60,000 from a childhood friend. He made sporadic efforts to pay the debt, but at one point he told the lender he might have to file for bankruptcy. He assured the lender that if he did file, he would not include the debt in his bankruptcy. When the debtor finally did file for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, he did not list the debt in his schedules, inform the trustee or the court of the debt, or inform the lender of the bankruptcy. The lender therefore didn’t learn of the bankruptcy until the debtor received his discharge. Over a year after discharge, the debtor executed a new promissory note to the lender and made more payments on the debt.
At some point, however, the lender grew impatient with the slow progress on repayment and filed suit in state court. The debtor returned to the bankruptcy court and filed an adversary proceeding against the lender and his attorneys seeking a finding of contempt for violation of the discharge injunction. The bankruptcy court found that the debt had been discharged and that the defendants violated the discharge injunction. But the court declined to hold the defendants in contempt finding that they lacked the requisite scienter.
The only issues raised in the debtor’s appeal to the district court related to the bankruptcy court’s findings that 1) the lenders had no notice of the bankruptcy case until it was too late to seek a finding that the debt was nondischargeable, 2) that the defendants lacked the requisite scienter to justify a contempt order, and 3) that the debtor was not entitled to any relief other than a declaration that the debt was discharged.
The court set out the requirements for establishing contempt for a discharge violation: “(1) a discharge order has been entered (discharging the applicable debt); (2) the creditor had notice of the discharge order; (3) collection efforts continued regardless; and (4) there is no objectively reasonable basis for concluding that the creditor’s conduct might be lawful under the discharge order.”
Here the court took into consideration the long-term friendship between the parties, the debtor’s efforts to repay the loan including executing a post-discharge promissory note and making payments, and the debtor’s failure to tell the lender that he had filed for bankruptcy. The court found no error in the bankruptcy court’s finding that the defendants were unaware of the debtor’s bankruptcy filing until it was too late to file objections. In addition, the court found that the debtor indicated through word and action that he intended to repay the debt even after he received his discharge. All of these things gave the lender a reasonable basis to believe that the debt was not discharged and that he was within his rights to pursue repayment.
The court thus concluded that the bankruptcy court did not commit clear error in finding no basis for a contempt order against the defendants, nor did it err in finding that the only relief to which the debtor was entitled was an order declaring the $60,000 debt discharged.
The debtor has filed an appeal to the Third Circuit, case no. 23-1358.
Good Faith in Failure to Disclose Lawsuit
Where the debtor failed to amend her schedules before her case was closed, she forfeited the right to do so as a matter of course, but based on the facts and circumstances in this case, the debtor’s neglect was excusable. The court allowed her to reopen her case to claim an exemption in a personal injury settlement. In re Wantz, No. 18-2851 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. Jan. 5, 2023).
Prior to filing her chapter 7 petition, the debtor contacted a personal injury attorney who was representing other women suing the manufacturer of an implanted medical device to explore the possibility of filing a lawsuit. The attorney told the debtor via email that because she had not had the device removed, she would be unlikely to prevail in a lawsuit. When she filed for bankruptcy, the debtor did not disclose this potential cause of action in her bankruptcy. Shortly before receiving her discharge, she signed an Attorney Employment Contract with the personal injury attorney. That agreement stated only that the attorney would investigate her potential claim.
She received her discharge in October, 2018, and her case was closed in November, 2018. In 2020, the debtor received two emails from her personal injury attorney suggesting, but not directly stating, that a case had been filed on her behalf. In March, 2021, the debtor sought medical advice with respect to the device and, upon learning that it was the cause of her pain, had it removed. Her medical expenses were $7,000. At around the same time, the debtor learned that her personal injury case had settled and that she would net $6,500.
Three weeks later, the debtor moved to reopen her bankruptcy to add the settlement to her schedules and claim it as exempt. The trustee objected to the exemption arguing that it was untimely.
Rule 1009(a) provides that a debtor may amend a bankruptcy schedule as a matter of course any time before the case is closed. The question here was whether that automatic right to amend is reignited when a closed case is reopened. The debtor lobbied for the court to find that once a case is reopened the debtor’s right to amend her schedules is “as a matter of course,” as it would be under Rule 1009(a) and that any other conclusion would violate the holding in Law v. Siegel, 571 U.S. 415 (2014).
The court found the debtor’s interpretation of that case was overbroad. Law prohibited a court from surcharging a debtor’s exemptions based on equitable considerations and in contravention of Code provisions. Law did not deal with timeliness of an amendment to the schedule of exemptions. The court here found that because Rule 1009(a) specifically applies to a debtor’s right to amend prior to her case being closed, the obverse is not true. A debtor may not amend her schedules as a matter of course after the case is closed even if it is later reopened.
The court turned next to the impact of Rule 9006, which provides that, with certain specified exceptions, a court may extend a deadline after that deadline has expired upon a showing of excusable neglect. The debtor argued that Rule 9006 was inapplicable because that rule applies only when the act in question “is required or allowed to be done at or within a specified period by these rules.” The debtor argued that because the time for amending schedules is not circumscribed by a specific period but is tied to the non-specific point at which the case is closed, amendments are not subject to Rule 9006’s requirement of a finding of excusable neglect.
The court disagreed with the debtor and with the cases, such as Mendoza v. Montoya (In re Mendoza), 595 B.R. 849 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2019), supporting her position. It found that Rule 1009(a)’s requirement that an amendment be filed before the case is closed is sufficiently specific to bring it under the auspices of Rule 9006.
The court turned to whether the debtor had shown excusable neglect, finding that the inquiry was equitable in nature and involved consideration of all relevant circumstances.
The court agreed with the trustee that the debtor’s failure to disclose the lawsuit during her bankruptcy deprived the trustee of the opportunity to litigate the claim for the benefit of the estate. But the court found that prejudice to the trustee and creditors was not significant in light of the fact that the debtor could have claimed an exemption under 522(c) for the settlement at any time during her bankruptcy. The court was unwilling to agree that the trustee would likely have obtained a better outcome from the litigation had she been involved.
As to the length of the delay—three years between filing her petition and reopening her case—the court found the debtor was unaware of several salient facts that would have alerted her to the necessity of disclosing the claim. First, the debtor did not know the cause of her pain was due to the device; second she did not know her attorney had moved past the investigation stage and filed a claim on her behalf; and third, the debtor lacked the sophistication to untangle the conflicting information she had received from her personal injury lawyer. The court noted that the debtor’s personal injury case involved many plaintiffs and that the debtor did not have a relationship with her attorney, but dealt with him from a distance. The court concluded that the debtor acted in good faith.
With the final observation that the debtor’s ultimate recovery did not even meet her medical bills based on the injury, the court found the debtor was entitled to amend her schedules to claim the exemption.
Mortgagee Sanctioned for Non-Compliance with Rule 3002.1(b)
The mortgage creditor’s failure to comply with notice requirements of Rule 3002.1(b) when escrow and interest rates changed during bankruptcy, led the court to determine that the debtors were current on their mortgage payments and to sanction the mortgagee. In re Kinderknecht, No. 17-12530 (Bankr. D. Kans. Jan. 18, 2023).
When the debtors filed for chapter 13 bankruptcy they were current on their mortgage with Golden Belt Bank. The lending agreement included a variable interest rate which was 5.25% at the petition date and the debtors were required to maintain an escrow account. Their amended plan committed them to paying the mortgage and related fees through the trustee.
The debtors completed their payments under the plan and the trustee filed a Final Accounting, A Notice of Completion of Plan Payments, and Notice of Final Cure Payment. The Notice of Final Cure Payment included a notification pursuant to Rule 3002.1(g) to creditors including Golden Belt Bank to file within 21 days a statement indicating whether they agreed that any claimed default had in fact been paid. Golden Belt failed to file the statement.
After the debtors received their discharge but before the case was closed, Golden Belt sent them a notice of deficiency with respect to escrow payments. Though the record was unclear the court found that “[a]t some point, presumably in July 2019, Golden Belt Bank changed the interest rate on the mortgage without informing the Court under Rule 3002.1(b). At some point, possibly in July 2021, Golden Belt Bank ran an escrow analysis and projected a needed increase to escrow payments, but again did not inform the Court, the Chapter 13 Trustee, or the Debtors under Rule 3002.1(b).”
The debtors moved the court for a determination that they were current on their mortgage and sought an order requiring Golden Belt to credit their escrow account and perform a new escrow analysis. The debtors also sought an order prohibiting Golden Belt from charging any fees related to these issues and to pay the debtors’ attorney fees.
Under Rule 3002.1(b)(1) a mortgage creditor for a debtor in bankruptcy is required to file and serve within 21 days any changes to the payment or escrow amount or to the interest rate. That and the other end-of-plan filings such as those made by the trustee in this case are intended to avoid the problem of debtors successfully completing plan payments only to find that they have incurred and defaulted on new debt while in bankruptcy.
The court found that Golden Belt failed to comply with its obligations under Rule 3002.1(b). It was unpersuaded by Golden Belt’s argument that, as a lender of a federally-related mortgage loan, it was exempt under RESPA from escrow analysis and notice requirements when the borrower is in bankruptcy. The court found the RESPA exemption did not likewise exempt the lender from its contractual and bankruptcy obligations.
The court also rejected Golden Belt’s argument that its noncompliance was harmless because it did not seek to foreclose on the property and because the debtors’ bankruptcy case was still open giving them time to pay the escrow amount. The court found “the harm Debtors are experiencing is the exact harm Rule 3002.1 was designed to avoid. Debtors have completed payments on their Chapter 13 plan. Debtors’ discharge has been entered. Golden Belt Bank had ‘numerous, obvious opportunities’ to identify the needed increase to the escrow payment at any point between June 2018 and June 2022, but failed to do so.”
As a consequence of Golden Belt’s failure to comply, the court granted the debtors’ motion for an order that their mortgage payment was current. It further sanctioned Golden Belt under Rule 3002.1(i) by ordering it to credit the deficient escrow account the amount needed to be current and to run a new escrow analysis. The court noted that its order requiring Golden Belt to credit the escrow account where Golden Belt had advanced money that should have been paid by Debtors, could be deemed inequitable. But it found “the Bankruptcy Rules are in place to instill certainty in the bankruptcy process and eliminate surprises. Golden Belt Bank did not follow those systems, and the Rules mandate this result.” Finally, the court order Golden Belt to pay the debtors’ attorney fees and not to charge any additional fees related to this action.
test case 1
Sorry, Can’t Confirm Plan If You’re Dead
A debtor who has shuffled off this mortal coil cannot confirm a chapter 13 plan where he has no ability to fund it with future income and no need for the fresh start offered by bankruptcy discharge. In re Carrasco, No. 21-51420 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. July 19, 2022).
In this case, the debtor died after the meeting of the creditors, but before his proposed chapter 13 plan had been confirmed. The debtor’s counsel lobbied to substitute the debtor’s son to confirm the plan notwithstanding the fact that the debtor himself had ridden the carriage into immortality. The trustee objected to confirmation. [Read more…] about Sorry, Can’t Confirm Plan If You’re Dead
Scotus Denies Cert in Fee Harvesting Case
The Supreme Court denied certiorari in the case of Sensenich v. PHH Mortgage Corp., No. 21-1322 (cert denied, June 13, 2022). The Chapter 13 Trustee sought reversal of the Second Circuit decision that the bankruptcy court lacked the power to monetarily sanction PHH Mortgage Corp. for its fee harvesting practice which violated Bankruptcy Rule 3002.1. The Second Circuit held that the bankruptcy rule did not allow for punitive damages. The circuit court also held that the award could not be justified under the court’s inherent power because the bankruptcy court did not analyze that ground.