Respondents Say There Is No Genuine Circuit Split and Goldman’s Position Would Divide Enforcement of the Automatic Stay Between Bankruptcy Courts and Arbitrators
UPDATE: Rhea Brown and Gregory Maze have filed their brief opposing Goldman Sachs Bank USA’s petition for certiorari in Goldman Sachs Bank USA v. Brown, No. 25-1408, asking the Supreme Court to leave intact the Fourth Circuit’s decision permitting the bankruptcy court to retain their claims for violations of the automatic stay.
As we previously reported on June 24, 2026, Goldman filed its certiorari petition after the Fourth Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court’s refusal to compel arbitration of the debtors’ claims under 11 U.S.C. § 362(k). The Fourth Circuit concluded that, under the circumstances presented, arbitration would conflict with the Bankruptcy Code’s purposes by interfering with the bankruptcy court’s ability to enforce the automatic stay and centralize bankruptcy disputes. NCBRC and NACBA participated as amici before the Fourth Circuit.
Goldman filed its certiorari petition on June 16, 2026, arguing primarily that the Fourth Circuit created a circuit split with the Second Circuit’s 2006 decision in MBNA America Bank, N.A. v. Hill, 436 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2006).
The respondents filed their brief in opposition on August 24, 2026. The respondents, Rhea Ann Brown and Gregory Kevin Maze, continue to be represented by Theodore Ohmstede Bartholow III and Karen L. Kellett, of KELLET & BARTHOLOW, PLLC, Dallas, Texas; and Malissa L. Giles and Tracy A. Giles, of GILES & LAMBERT PC, Roanoke, Virginia.
Respondents Arguments Against Certiorari
The case does not implicate any circuit conflict warranting review. The respondents’ principal argument is that Hill and this case do not present the same issue in the same procedural posture.
In Hill, the debtor’s Chapter 7 bankruptcy had been completed and the case closed when the court considered arbitration. Brown, by contrast, remains in an active Chapter 13 case in which the automatic stay continues to serve its central bankruptcy function. Respondents argue that the Fourth Circuit therefore properly viewed Hill as distinguishable rather than conflicting authority.
The issue is not sufficiently recurring to warrant Supreme Court review. Respondents note that in the approximately four decades since Congress enacted what is now § 362(k), only two courts of appeals have directly addressed the arbitration question, with Hill decided twenty years ago.
This case is a poor vehicle to bring these issues before the court. Brown’s Chapter 13 case remains pending, while Maze’s Chapter 7 case has closed, yet Goldman did not ask the Fourth Circuit to conduct separate arbitration analyses for the two debtors. Respondents argue that the Supreme Court should not grant review only to confront distinctions the court below was never asked to decide.
They identify another vehicle problem as well: if the Supreme Court wishes to resolve the broader relationship between arbitration and enforcement of the automatic stay, respondents argue it should do so in a case presenting both § 362(k) and § 105(a). Goldman’s concession that § 105(a) relief is non-arbitrable effectively takes half of that question off the table.
Waiver Goldman waived the position it now advances by telling the bankruptcy court that it had discretion to determine whether the claims should be sent to arbitration. They argue the Supreme Court should not grant review to consider an alleged error Goldman effectively invited below.
What Comes Next
The Supreme Court has not yet decided whether it will hear the case. The filing of the brief in opposition moves the petition closer to consideration by the Justices.
NCBRC and NACBA did not file an amicus brief at the certiorari stage. Both organizations continue to follow the case closely, however, and if the Supreme Court grants certiorari, NCBRC and NACBA intend to participate as amici in support of preserving bankruptcy courts’ authority to enforce the automatic stay.
We will continue to report developments in the case.