Judicial Estoppel

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Eleventh Circuit Applies New Judicial Estoppel Analysis

When addressing judicial estoppel, courts may no longer apply a presumption of motive to conceal, but must look at the facts and circumstances behind a bankruptcy debtor’s failure to disclose his civil action in the bankruptcy proceeding. Silva v. Pro Transport Inc., No. 17-12744 (11th Cir. Aug. 10, 2018).

After Julio Antonio Silva’s Chapter 13 bankruptcy plan was confirmed, he filed an FLSA claim in district court against his employers for failure to pay overtime. He did not tell his civil counsel about his bankruptcy nor did he immediately inform the bankruptcy court of the district court case. The district court granted the employer’s motion for summary judgment based on judicial estoppel and awarded over $50,000 to the employer in sanctions and attorney fees. Mr. Silva appealed the sanctions award. [Read more…] about Eleventh Circuit Applies New Judicial Estoppel Analysis

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Debtors’ Challenge to Private Student Loan Survives Dismissal Motion

A private loan in excess of the cost of attendance is not subject to exception from discharge under Section 523(a)(8)(A)(ii). McDaniel v. Navient Solutions, No. 09-37450, Adv. Proc. No. 17-1274 (Bankr. D. Colo. Sept. 2018).

In their confirmed Chapter 13 plan, Byron and Laura McDaniel treated their student loans, including those held by Navient Solutions, as unsecured Class Four claims to be deferred until after discharge. Upon completion of their plan, the McDaniels obtained discharge, but later moved to reopen. They filed an adversary proceeding seeking a declaration that a particular private loan held by Navient was not excepted from discharge. They also sought a finding that Navient violated the discharge injunction by collecting on that private loan post-discharge. Navient moved to dismiss the adversary proceeding. [Read more…] about Debtors’ Challenge to Private Student Loan Survives Dismissal Motion

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No Recovery for Foreclosure Sale of Non-Disclosed Property

The Chapter 13 debtor was judicially estopped from challenging the foreclosure sale of his property as a violation of the automatic stay because he failed to disclose his ownership interest in the property. Fornesa v. Fifth Third Mortgage Co., No. 17-20324 (5th Cir. July 27, 2018). [Read more…] about No Recovery for Foreclosure Sale of Non-Disclosed Property

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Collateral Estoppel Applied to “Death Penalty” Default Judgment

Where the family court litigation was resolved in favor of the debtor’s ex-husband after the court struck the debtor’s pleadings in a sanctions order, the elements of collateral estoppel applied to preclude the debtor from challenging the state court orders in her subsequent Chapter 7 bankruptcy case. Dahlin v. Dahlin, No. 16-36169, Adv. Proc. No. 17-3425 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. May 15, 2018). [Read more…] about Collateral Estoppel Applied to “Death Penalty” Default Judgment

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Local Rule for Dismissal without Hearing Is Inconsistent with Code

The Code requires notice and a hearing before a bankruptcy court dismisses a debtor’s Chapter 13 case, and a contrary Local Rule is invalid. No v. Gorman (In re No), No. 17-1679 (4th Cir. May 24, 2018).

Sarah Hyunsoon No filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy and filed a proposed plan, but failed to attend the meeting of creditors or make the first payment under the plan as required under Section 1326 and Local Rule 3070-1(C). The trustee, Thomas Gorman, certified to the court that by failing to commence payments under the plan, Ms. No had failed to comply with the Local Rule and that her case was therefore subject to dismissal. Although the bankruptcy court scheduled a hearing on the motion, it dismissed Ms. No’s case before the hearing. The district court affirmed. [Read more…] about Local Rule for Dismissal without Hearing Is Inconsistent with Code

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Circuit Rejects Mechanical Application of Judicial Estoppel

The district court abused its discretion when it mechanically applied judicial estoppel to bar the plaintiff’s personal injury lawsuit after he and his wife successfully completed their 100% plan. Clark v. Advanced Composites Grp., No. 17-1727 (2d Cir. March 30, 2018).

Michele and John Clark had one more payment due on their five-year Chapter 13 plan when Mr. Clark was diagnosed with mesothelioma which he believed to have been caused by exposure to asbestos through his service with the United States Air Force and in his subsequent private sector work. The Clarks notified their bankruptcy counsel of his diagnosis and their intention to commence litigation, but their counsel did not notify the bankruptcy court. The Clarks successfully completed their plan payments. One year later, and one week prior to formal discharge and closure of their bankruptcy, Mr. Clark filed a personal injury complaint against Boeing and numerous other corporations. The case was removed to district court. Boeing then moved to dismiss the lawsuit on grounds of judicial estoppel. Finding that the Clarks’ failure to disclose Mr. Clark’s diagnosis to the bankruptcy court amounted to a false representation which the bankruptcy court acted upon by discharging them, the district court granted the motion. Mr. Clark died during the pendency of the appeal. [Read more…] about Circuit Rejects Mechanical Application of Judicial Estoppel

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Eleventh Circuit Eliminates Presumption of Intent for Judicial Estoppel

Whether a debtor intends to make a mockery of the judicial system when she fails to disclose a civil lawsuit in her bankruptcy schedules requires consideration of a totality of facts and circumstances. Slater v. U.S. Steel Corp., No. 12- 15548 (11th Cir. Sept. 18, 2017).

When she filed her chapter 7 bankruptcy petition, Sandra Slater failed to disclose her civil lawsuit for retaliation and discrimination in her employment that was pending in district court. In fact, in her Schedule B and in the Statement of Financial Affairs she affirmatively stated that she had no contingent claims or pending lawsuits. After her bankruptcy was fully administrated, U.S. Steel moved for summary judgment in the district court seeking a finding that her pending claims for employment discrimination should be barred by the doctrine of judicial estoppel due to her failure to disclose them in her bankruptcy. The next day, explaining that she had misunderstood the questions in the bankruptcy filings, Ms. Slater amended her bankruptcy documents to list the lawsuit. The bankruptcy court granted the trustee’s motion for an order to employ Ms. Slater’s current district court lawyers (who were different from her bankruptcy lawyer) so they could continue to pursue the employment lawsuit. Ms. Slater then converted from chapter 7 to chapter 13 but failed to make all required contributions to the plan and her case was ultimately dismissed.

Based on Eleventh Circuit precedents, Barger v. City of Cartersville, 348 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2003) and Burnes v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., 291 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2002), the district court in Ms. Slater’s civil case held that the claims were barred by judicial estoppel by virtue of her failure to disclose and the presumption that she was motivated by the desire to conceal the asset from bankruptcy creditors. The court granted summary judgment to U.S. Steel. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, but in her concurring opinion, Judge Tjoflat urged the court to reconsider its precedents en banc.

In en banc review, the Eleventh Circuit reconsidered its rule that “the mere fact of the plaintiff’s nondisclosure is sufficient [to establish intent to mislead], even if the plaintiff corrected his bankruptcy disclosures after the omission was called to his attention and the bankruptcy court allowed the correction without penalty.”

The court began its analysis with a look at of the difference between chapter 7 and chapter 13, finding that, in chapter 7, the debtor’s property becomes part of the bankruptcy estate to be administered by the trustee and, therefore, only the trustee has standing to pursue a pending lawsuit. In chapter 13, on the other hand, once a plan is confirmed the property of the estate reverts to the debtor and she has standing to maintain the civil suit.

With this difference in mind, the court turned to principles of judicial estoppel. Under that doctrine, a court will bar a suit when the person against whom the doctrine is to be applied “(1) took a position under oath in the bankruptcy proceeding that was inconsistent with the plaintiff’s pursuit of the civil lawsuit and (2) intended to make a mockery of the judicial system.” It is the second prong of this test that the court focused on in its decision, noting that Barger and Burnes essentially create a presumption of satisfaction of the second prong by virtue of satisfaction of the first.

The court found the presumption erroneously ignored the possibility that a debtor’s failure to disclose could be based on inadvertence or mistake and was inconsistent with other precedents out of the Eleventh Circuit. For instance, Parker v. Wendy’s Int’l, Inc., 365 F.3d 1268, 1272 (11th Cir. 2004), held that judicial estoppel could not be applied to bar a chapter 7 debtor’s civil lawsuit because that debtor, having lost standing to pursue the civil case upon filing for bankruptcy, could not have taken inconsistent positions as to her assets. In Ajaka v. Brooksamerica Mortgage Corp., 453 F.3d 1339 (11th Cir. 2006), the court looked to judicial estoppel in the context of chapter 13. There, the debtor disclosed the civil action to his bankruptcy attorney, but the attorney failed to list it in the bankruptcy schedules. The creditors, however, were aware of the lawsuit and the debtor amended his schedules later to include it. The Eleventh Circuit found the district court’s application of judicial estopped to have been in error and remanded with instructions for the court to address whether the debtor had the requisite intent to conceal.

The Slater panel found that proper analysis of the second prong of the judicial estoppel test requires examination of a totality of the facts and circumstances including, but not limited to, such factors as the debtor’s level of sophistication, whether and under what circumstances she corrected the nondisclosure, whether the debtor’s attorney and/or the creditors were aware of the lawsuit, whether the debtor revealed any other lawsuits to which she was a party, and what action the bankruptcy court deemed appropriate to address the late disclosure. The court overruled Barger and Burnes to the extent they allowed a court to infer a debtor’s intent to mislead without considering these and other relevant circumstances.

The court reasoned that its current ruling was more in line with the principles behind the doctrine of judicial estoppel. It ensures that the debtor had the requisite culpable mental state, it allows the actions of the bankruptcy court to be taken into consideration thereby addressing whether the omission in fact undermined the integrity of the judicial system, and it better supports the equitable underpinnings of the doctrine.  Because the bankruptcy Code and Rules permit a debtor to amend her schedules at any time, and allows the court to reopen a case to administer an asset, the bankruptcy system has its own tools for dealing with non-disclosures to avoid apparent manipulation. The court also noted that “[i]f a court applies judicial estoppel to bar the plaintiff’s claim absent such intent, it awards the civil defendant an unjustified windfall.” Furthermore, as a practical matter, application of judicial estoppel could deprive the debtor’s creditors of the benefits of a victory in the civil lawsuit.

The court noted that in so holding, it joined three other circuits that have applied a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis to the question of judicial estoppel. See Spanie v. Cmty. Contacts, Inc., 756 F.3d 542, 548 (7th Cir. 2014); Ah Quin v. Cty. of Kauai Dep’t. of Transp., 733 F.3d 267, 276 (9th Cir. 2013); Eubanks v. CBSK Fin. Grp., Inc., 385 F.3d 894, 899 (6th Cir. 2004). It disagreed with two circuits applying a similar presumption as that overruled in Barger and Burnes. See, e.g., Eastman v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 493 F.3d 1151, 1157-60 (10th Cir. 2007); Ine Superior Crewboats, Inc., 374 F.3d 330, 335-36 (5th Cir. 2004).

The court remanded to the panel to determine whether the district court abused its discretion in applying judicial estoppel to Ms. Slater’s civil lawsuit.

Chief Judge Ed Carnes filed a concurring opinion noting that the decision allows a court to consider the credibility of the debtor even if her testimony with respect to intent is uncontradicted.

Much of the reasoning applied by the en banc panel was argued by NACBA in its amicus brief.

Slater 11th Cir. opinion Sept 2017

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Equitable Estoppel vs. Right to Amend Schedules

Where new facts arose to support a claim for homestead exemption and the debtor did not make any misrepresentation upon which the trustee reasonably relied, the bankruptcy court erred in disallowing the exemption based on equitable estoppel. Lua v. Miller (In re Lua), No. 15-56814 (9th Cir. June 27, 2017) (unpublished).

Rosalva Lua claimed a homestead exemption in her initial bankruptcy schedules, removed the claim in her First Amended Schedules, and reasserted it in her Second Amended Schedules approximately three years later. The bankruptcy court sustained the trustee’s objection to the exemption based on equitable estoppel. The district court affirmed. [Read more…] about Equitable Estoppel vs. Right to Amend Schedules

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NACBA Takes On 11th Circuit Judicial Estoppel Doctrine

NCBRC has filed an amicus brief in the Eleventh Circuit on behalf of the NACBA membership to address the issue of that circuit’s approach to judicial estoppel. Slater v. U.S. Steel, No. 12-15568 (filed October 24, 2016).

Twenty-one months after filing an employment discrimination suit in federal district court against her former employer, U.S. Steel, Sandra Slater filed for bankruptcy. (The original case was filed under Chapter 7 and later converted to Chapter 13). She failed to list the pending federal case in her bankruptcy schedules. U.S. Steel then moved the district court to bar the discrimination suit based on the doctrine of judicial estoppel. The district court granted the motion, and Ms. Slater appealed. [Read more…] about NACBA Takes On 11th Circuit Judicial Estoppel Doctrine