Posted by NCBRC - February 16th, 2021
Payday lenders belonging to a Native American Tribe enjoy sovereign immunity from suit under section 362 for violation of the automatic stay. In re Coughlin, No. 19-14142 (Bankr. D. Mass. Oct. 19, 2020).
The chapter 13 debtor filed a motion seeking a finding that a group of payday lenders violated the automatic stay when they continued to dun him for payments after he filed his bankruptcy petition. The creditors, all members of a Native American Tribe, moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that they were entitled to sovereign immunity for their conduct. Read More
Posted by NCBRC - February 12th, 2021
Where the only injury resulting from bankruptcy counsel’s conduct was denial of discharge, the cause of action for legal malpractice accrued post-petition and belonged to the debtors rather than the chapter 7 bankruptcy estate. Church Joint Venture, L.P. v. Blasingame, No. 19-5505 (6th Cir. Jan. 26, 2021).
The debtors filed for chapter 7 bankruptcy but were denied discharge when the court learned of undisclosed assets in the form of personal property, shell companies, family trusts, etc. The debtors filed a malpractice lawsuit against their bankruptcy attorneys in state court. When the trustee declined to bring a suit against the debtors’ attorneys on behalf of the bankruptcy estate, the debtors’ primary creditor, CJV, obtained derivative standing to do so. CJV moved for summary judgment on the issue of whether the cause of action belonged to the estate. The court treated the debtors’ response as a cross-motion for summary judgment and granted judgment in favor of the debtors. The BAP for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. Church Joint Ventures, L.P. v. Blasingame (In re Blasingame), 597 B.R. 614 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2019). Read More
Posted by NCBRC - February 8th, 2021
A state-mandated notification with the state taxing authority of a change in the taxpayer’s federal taxes is a “return, or equivalent report or notice,” which, if not filed by the taxpayer, renders the state tax debt nondischargeable under section 523(a)(1)(B). Berkovich v. Calif. Franchise Tax Bd., No. 20-1025 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Oct. 5, 2020). Read More
Posted by NCBRC - February 4th, 2021
The debtor was permitted to voluntarily dismiss her chapter 13 case under section 1307(b) despite the judgment creditor’s objections and a technical error, where, even if a good faith component is read into the statute, the creditor failed to provide evidence of bad faith and was otherwise provided due process. Murphy v. Marinari (In re Marinari), No. 19-3642 (3rd Cir. Jan. 19, 2021) (unpublished).
The judgment creditor filed a claim and an adversary proceeding in the debtor’s chapter 13 case. The debtor filed an “application” to voluntarily dismiss her bankruptcy case under section 1307(b). When the bankruptcy court dismissed the case over the creditor’s objection, the creditor appealed. The district court affirmed. Read More
Posted by NCBRC - January 29th, 2021
Garnished wages divided between the creditor and his agent in accordance with their fee agreement were an avoidable transfer in their entirety even though the creditor never received the portion withheld by the agent. Hooker v. Wanigas Credit Union, No. 20-2252 (6th Cir. Jan. 26, 2021) (unpublished).
During the ninety-day preference period,Wanigas Credit Union, through its agent, Shek Law Offices, garnished $884.13 from the debtor’s wages in satisfaction of a judgment Wanigas had against the debtor. Shek retained $452.60 of the garnished wages and sent the remaining $431.53 to Wanigas. After filing for bankruptcy the debtor sought turnover of the funds under section 547(b)(1) as a preferential transfer. Wanigas turned over only the funds it received. It argued that the portion retained by Shek was not subject to turnover because Wanigas never received the funds, and in the alternative, because the funds were subject to an attorney-charging lien. The bankruptcy court denied Wanigas’s motion for summary judgment and ordered turnover of the funds. The district court granted leave to appeal and affirmed. Read More
Posted by NCBRC - January 21st, 2021
Under section 1325(a)(5), a chapter 13 plan cannot provide for different treatment of two vehicles which were purchased at different times with loans from the same creditor where both lending agreements included cross-collateralization clauses securing each loan by both vehicles. Barragan-Flores v. Evolve Federal Credit Union, No. 18-50420 (5th Cir. Jan 14, 2021). Read More
Posted by NCBRC - January 18th, 2021
In an unhappy start to the new year, the Supreme Court resolved a long-festering issue in favor of creditors when it found that “mere retention of property does not violate §362(a)(3).” City of Chicago v. Fulton, 592 U.S. ___, No. 19-357 (S.Ct. Jan. 14, 2021).
Here, a number of chapter 13 debtors entered bankruptcy after the City of Chicago impounded their vehicles for failure to pay traffic fines. In their separate cases, the debtors sought return of the vehicles arguing that once they filed for bankruptcy, the City’s retention of the vehicles violated the automatic stay. The bankruptcy courts in each case agreed with the debtors. In a consolidated opinion, the Seventh Circuit found that retention of the vehicles constituted an exercise of control over property of the estate within the meaning of section 362(a)(3). It affirmed. In re Fulton, 926 F. 3d 916 (7th Cir. 2019). Read More
Posted by NCBRC - January 13th, 2021
Surrender of collateral under section 521(a)(2) is a procedural action lifting the bankruptcy stay and permitting a lienholder to exercise state remedies with respect to the collateral. Because surrender does not affect the substantive rights of the debtor or the creditor, however, the debtor could not compel the creditor to take possession or release the lien. In re Loucks, 619 B.R. 908 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Oct. 9, 2020) (case no. 20-42265). Read More
Posted by NCBRC - January 11th, 2021
Private loans extended for the purpose of paying the debtor’s “costs of attendance” at the University of Michigan and which, taken in conjunction with the debtor’s Pell Grants, did not exceed the debtor’s education expenses, fell within section 523(a)(8)(B)’s exception to discharge. MacEwan Conti v. Arrowood Indemnity Co., No. 20-1172 (6th Cir. Dec. 14, 2020). Read More
Posted by NCBRC - January 6th, 2021
Adopting a plain-meaning approach, the Second Circuit found a debtor may avoid a lien that impairs her exemption on property her dependent son lives in part-time but is not his primary residence. Donovan v. Maresca (In re Maresca), No. 19-3331 (2d Cir. Dec. 14, 2020).
The debtor lived in an apartment, and her ex-husband lived in the marital residence (the Property) which he and the debtor owned jointly. They had joint custody of their dependent son whose primary residence was with his mother but who spent several days a week with his father in the Property as his “non-primary” residence. At the time the debtor filed for chapter 7 bankruptcy, her divorce lawyer had a judgment lien on the Property securing almost $71,000 in legal fees. She claimed an exemption on her interest in the Property under section 522(d) and sought to avoid the lien under section 522(f)(1)(A) as impairing that exemption. The bankruptcy court granted the debtor’s motion to avoid the lien. The district court affirmed. Read More
